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THE SWORD

of Damocles is suspended over the head of the
investor in a regulated industry. Business enterprises may be
purchased or merged or industry practices may be established under
the approving eye of one regulatory agency only to have the transaction or practice upset years later through an antitrust suit brought
by another arm of government. Like the Fates, one arm of government may spin the thread of industrial life while the other severs
it. The "unscrambling" of business enterprises and the discontinuance of long-standing industry practices involve substantial economic waste. The absence of trustworthy standards by which to
determine whether the prospective transaction will withstand
scrutiny by two agencies of government at different points in time
contributes to the complexity of business judgment.
The overriding consideration in accommodating the antitrust
laws to regulated industry is that the public interest be served. To
the extent that the general good requires determination of the same
matter by different agencies of government at different times, the
interests of the business involved must be subordinated. Accordingly, a significant objection to conflicting courses of action by two
agencies of government is that the action of one may undermine
the action of the other with a resulting impairment of the public
interest. However, in the interest of the individual investor or the
business concerned, there is the legitimate objection that the business finds itself caught in the middle of conflicting tugs by two arms
of government, one approving and the other restraining the trans* The substance of this article was presented on December 29, 1963, at the Round
Table on Antitrust in the Regulated Industry, conducted at the annual meeting of
the Association of American Law Schools, Los Angeles, California.
t-Dean and Wald Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law.
The author served as Director of the FCC Broadcast Network Study during 19551957 and Consultant to the Office of the FCC Commissioners from 1961 until July,
1963. The views expressed herein do not purport to represent the opinion of any
member of the FCC or of its staff.
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action or practice involved. Government in a democratic society
should be administered with greater nicety and orderliness.
It is an anomaly that the antitrust and regulatory approaches
should conflict, because the antitrust laws and regulatory statutes
have a common purpose, to assure that business enterprise serves the
public interest. Active competitive behavior is a strong discipline
upon the free enterprise system, encouraging it to achieve optimum
fruitfulness. The antitrust laws are designed to remove restraints
upon competition which prevent free enterprise from operating in
accordance with this basic philosophy. In a few areas of economic
life, experience has shown that competition is wasteful, and here
entry is limited and rates are controlled. As a substitute for the
discipline of free competition, the regulatory agencies design controls to achieve the public interest, including controls designed to
promote competition within the limitations of the restricted entry.
Regulation should be substituted for the natural discipline of competition only where there is a demonstrated impairment of the
public interest by the forces of competition, and even then the
regulatory road should not be travelled beyond the border of such
impairment.
Appropriate accommodation of the antitrust and regulatory approaches is no simple matter. On the basis of a study of several industries, two authors concluded recently that true interventionist
regulation must constantly expand; that adoption of the interventionist approach, allowing reasonable time for expansion, leaves no
room for the antitrust approach; and that only if there is a practical
barrier to this "mushroom" principle, such as a vast number of
firms to be regulated, should there be a mixture of antitrust and
regulatory approaches.1 This conclusion suggests that transactions
approved by regulatory agencies should be exempt from the antitrust
laws. Express statutory exemption from the antitrust laws of some
types of transactions approved by regulatory agencies has been
granted.2 On the other hand, Professor Carl Fulda, on the basis of
2 Hale 8: Hale, Competition or Control VI: Application of Antitrust Laws to
Regulated Industries, 111 U. PA. L. Rav. 46, 57 (1962).
2 See, e.g., Federal Aviation Act § 414, 72 Stat. 770 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1384 (1958);
Federal Communications Act § 221 (a), 48 Stat. 1080 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. §
221 (a) (1958), § 222 (c) (1), added by 57 Stat. 7 (1943), 47 U.S.C. § 222 (c) (1) (1958);
Interstate Commerce Act § 5 (11), as amended, B4 Stat. 908 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 5 (11)
(1958), § 5a (9), added by 62 Stat. 473 (1948), 49 U.S.C. § 5b(9) (1958), § 22, as
amended, 71 Stat. 564 (1957), 49 U.S.C. § 22 (1958); Federal Maritime Act § 15,
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a study of the transportation industries, concluded that a fine mixture of antitrust action and regulation offers the best solution., It
may be noted that the express exemption approach and the mixture
of antitrust and regulation approach are not diametrically opposed.
The Supreme Court has advised that even where transactions approved by a regulatory agency have been exempted from the antitrust laws, the regulatory agency must weigh the effect of curtailed
competition against the advantage in service resulting from the
transaction and that, if the agency's conclusion is not supported by
adequate evidence and findings, the transaction may be upset on
grounds which take antitrust policy into account.4 Where exemption from the antitrust laws has not been legislated, the accommodation of the competitive and interventionist approaches poses complex problems, the sound solution of which requires painstaking
analysis. 5
Accommodation of the antitrust and regulatory approaches to
the promotion of competition in the regulated industries should
vary, depending upon the nature and extent of the regulation of the
industry concerned. The greater the decision-making freedom in
the regulated industry, the greater is the scope of operation of
the antitrust laws. In public utilities, where entry is limited to
prevent wasteful competition and rates are regulated, the role of
the antitrust laws is perforce narrower than in the open market. On
the other hand, in the broadcasting industry, where entry is controlled solely because of the limited radio spectrum and rates are
not regulated, the scope of application of the antitrust laws is broad.
The purpose of this article is to suggest a mode of accommodating the roles of the Department of Justice and the Federal
Communications Commission in promoting competition in one
regulated industry, the broadcasting industry. The suggested
solution might well be adaptable to some other regulated industries.
S9 Stat. 733 (1916), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1958); Webb-Pomerone Act § 2, 40
Stat. 517 (1918), 15 U.S.C. § 62 (1958); Clayton Act § 7, as amended, 64 Stat. 1125
(1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958).
aFULDA, COMPETITION IN THE REGULATED INDUSTRIES: TRANSPORTATION
McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 821 U.S. 67, 87-88 (1944).
See ATT'Y GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUST REP. 261-93 (1955).

453 (1961).
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I
ENCOURAGING COMPETITION IN

BROADCASTING

THROUGH THE REGULATORY APPROACH

In assaying the appropriate accommodation of the roles of the
Department of Justice and the Federal Communications Commission in promoting competition in broadcasting, consideration should
be given to the pervasiveness of the competitive element in the
Commission's regulation of broadcasting.
The Federal Communications Act expressly makes the antitrust
laws applicable to broadcasting and provides for the preservation of
competition in broadcasting. 6 Further, it states that radio broadcasters shall not be deemed common carriers. 7 In its Report on
Chain Broadcasting issued in 1941, the Commission recognized it
should administer its regulatory powers with respect to broadcasting in
the light of the purposes which the Sherman Act was designed to achieve.
In the absence of Congressional action exempting the industry from the
antitrust laws, we are not at liberty to condone practices which tend to
monopoly and contractual restrictions destructive of freedom of trade
and competitive opportunityS
In 1959, the Supreme Court in United States v. RCA9 held that approval by the Commission of the transfer of a station, after considering and deciding all issues relative to the antitrust laws which
were before it, did not foreclose the Department from bringing an
antitrust suit to challenge the transfer. Since the antitrust and
regulatory approaches to promoting competition are broadly applied
in broadcasting, the area of potential conflict between the approaches
is substantial.
The Commission implements the Federal Communications Act
through three basic elements of policy: competition, diversification,
and licensee responsibility. The Commission has encouraged competition in broadcasting by (a) promoting new entry into each com148 Stat. 1087 (1934), 47 U.S.C. §§ 313-14 (1958). The Supreme Court has
recognized that broadcasting is an area of free competition, FCC v. Saunders Bros.
Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940); that in regulating in the "public interest, convenience and necessity," the Commission may consider antitrust policy, NBC v. United
States, 319 U.S. 190, 222-24 (1942); and that the Commission may deny a requested action on the sole ground that the action would be incompatible with antitrust policy,
United States v. RCA, 358 U.S. 334, 351-52 (1959 , citing Mansfield Journal Co. v.
FCC, 180 F.2d 28, 33-34 (1950).
7 48 Stat. 1082 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 153 (h) (1958).
FCC REPORT ON CHAIN BROADCASTING 46-47 (1941).

'358 U.S. 334 (1959).
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ponent of the industry and competition between units of each component, (b) preventing anticompetitive practices, and (c) forestalling concentration of economic control contrary to the public interest. Moreover, in actions taken to implement the other two basic
elements of FCC policy, diversification and licensee responsibility,
the competitive element is present in varying degree. 10
The chain broadcasting rules were adopted to control certain
industry practices which had been found contrary to the public
interest because the practices were designed to restrict competition
in broadcasting." To the industry prophecy that the rules would
result in the eventual destruction of the national program service,
the Commission replied: "Radio broadcasting is a competitive industry. The Congress... has required the fullest measure of com' 2
petition possible within the physical limitations."'
Similarly, the purpose of the FCC Broadcast Network Study
conducted from 1955 to 1957 was to determine whether the relationship between television and radio networks and their affiliates and
other components of the industry tended to foster or impede the
development of a nationwide competitive broadcasting system. 1
All of the changes in industry practices recommended as a result of
that study were intended to further the public interest in broadcasting through promoting competition between and among all
components of the broadcasting industry, diversifying opinion and
program sources, and protecting the freedom of the licensed broadcaster to exercise his responsibility.
New entry at the local level has been encouraged to the extent
of disregarding contentions that the potential advertising revenue
will not support the existing station and the proposed entrant at an
economic level necessary to provide program service meeting the
public interest standard. 14
The deintermixture report and order in 1956 recognized that
UHF stations could not compete with VHF stations and sought to
10The role of the competitive element in the FCC's regulation of broadcasting is
analyzed in FCC NETWORK BROADCASTING, REPORT or THE NETWORK STUDY STAFF To
Tm NETWORK STUDY Coxsmirrr 64-106 (1957). This report is hereinafter referred to as
NETWORK BROADCASTING, and the pagination is to the reprint by the Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, H.R. REP. No. 1297, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
"FCC REPORT ON CHAIN BROADCASTING 88.
2Ibid.
13 NETWORK BROADCASTING 1.
14 Southeastern Enterprises, 22 F.C.C. 605 (1957); Voice of Cullman,
1

REG. 164

(1950).

6 P &F

RADIO
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equalize opportunity by allocating frequencies in such manner that
stations in the same community would either be all VHF or all
UHF.15 Similarly, the recent legislation authorizing the Commission to require that television receivers shipped in interstate commerce be capable of receiving all frequencies allocated to television
broadcasting was intended to render UHF stations competitive with
VHF ones. 6
For an example of promotion of competition at the network
level, one may refer to the early days of radio, when the Commission
ordered NBC, which owned two radio networks, the Red and the
Blue, to divest itself of one of the networks.' 7 The Blue network
was divested and became ABC. When ABC proved unable to compete with the established networks, the FCC approved the merger
of ABC and United Paramount Theatres in order that ABC might
obtain sufficient working capital to develop a competitive network. 8
An example of action by the Commission to forestall undue
economic concentration of control is the multiple ownership rule,
limiting the number of television stations which the same interest
may own to seven, not more than five of which may be in the VHF
spectrum. The Commission has emphasized that these rules are
intended to implement congressional policy against monopoly and
to preserve competition.' 9 Whether the ceiling is rightly placed
is another matter.20
In evaluating an application for a license to broadcast, the Commission has recognized a duty to consider antitrust violations by the
applicant.2 1
Under present circumstances, the principal competition with
networks must come from the national spot system of broadcasting.
'I FCC Docket No. 11532.
10 76 Stat. 150 (1962), 47 U.S.C. § 303 (s) (Supp. IV, 1963).
17 Radio Corp. of America, 10 F.C.C. 212, 213 (1943).
21 FCC Docket No. 10031, 8 P & F RADIO REG. 541 (1953).
" See, e.g., FCC Docket No. 8967. See also FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co.,
309 U.S. 134, 137 (1940).
-0°The pattern of ownership of television stations in the largest, commercially
desirable markets is one of very high concentration of multiple ownership.
In
bargaining with networks, national spot representatives, and independent program
suppliers, multiple station-unit owners, acting for their group of stations as a whole,
have been able to obtain more favorable terms than single station owners receive.
The FCC Broadcast Network Study staff recommended that the FCC, in the long
run, seek a pattern of ownership which looks toward one station to a customer.
NETWORK BROADCASTING 533-600 (see especially 560-68).
1 FCC Docket No. 9572, Report on Uniform Policy as to Violations by Applicants
of Laws of the United States (1951).
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Prior to 1959, CBS and NBC represented some of their affiliated
stations in national spot sales. The Commission found that, as
competitors of their affiliated stations for national television advertising and as competitors with the national spot system of television
advertising, the networks had conflicting interests in their affiliates'
national spot rates. It might be in the interest of the station to
establish its national spot rate substantially lower than its network
rate to attract national spot advertising. It was in the interest of
the network, however, in protecting network rates, to set the national
spot rate as high as the network rate. Thus, when a network represented an affiliated station in national spot television, the interest
of the network was served by influencing the affiliated station to set
a high, anticompetitive rate for national spot sales; and such price
leadership served as an example to other affiliated stations. 22 Acnetwork representation of
cordingly, the Commission prohibited
23
sales.
spot
national
in
stations
affiliated
The FCC currently has under advisement the report of the
Office of Network Study on Television Network Program Procurement which, in the light of findings that the networks have high
concentration of control of television programming and that this
concentration limits the opportunity of the national spot system to
compete with the network system, 24 has recommended that networks
be prohibited from owning an interest in programs for syndication
in the national spot system and that the ownership by networks of
programs broadcast over the networks in prime time not exceed
fifty per cent.25
The Commission's prohibition of the option time practice, discussed hereinafter, was based on findings that the practice restrains
competition contrary to the public interest.
Thus, most action taken by the FCC reflects to some degree the
competitive element in broadcast regulatory policy. The competitive element is pervasive. However, it is accommodated with other
basic elements of FCC policy, diversification and licensee responsibility.
In characterizing the competitive element in the regulation of
2

FCC 59-1119 (1959), FCC Docket No. 1276.

23 47 C.F.R. § 3.658 (i) (Supp. 1963).
24FCC TELEVISION NETWoRK PROGRAM PROCUREMENT

102-05 (1963).
Pagination
herein is that of the reprint of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, H.R. REP. No. 281, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
25ld. at 117-18.
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broadcasting as pervasive, it is not implied that the FCC has in

every instance given appropriate encouragement to competition.
Judgment will differ as to whether the FCC has in some instances
soundly weighed the essentiality of an industry practice against the
impingement of that practice upon the public interest and the anti26
trust laws.

II
EXAMPLES OF CONFLICT BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT AND THE
COMMISSION IN APPLYING THE ANTITRUST AND REGULATORY
APPROACHES TO BROADCASTING

To illustrate the need for accommodation of the antitrust and
regulatory approaches in encouraging competition in broadcasting,
three instances of conflict between the Department and the Commission can be cited.
A. The Option Time Practice
Time optioning received extensive study by the Commission's
Broadcast Network Study staff, established in 1955.27 This group
concluded that time optioning restrained competition contrary to the
public interest, that the practice was not necessary to the operation of
healthy networks, and that the practice should be prohibited under
the public interest standard. It concluded further that the practice
28
contravened the antitrust laws.
Following issuance of the staff report, the Commission held hearings thereon" and concluded by a four to three vote that time optioning was reasonably necessary to the successful conduct of network
operations and, thus, was in the public interest 30
In accordance with an understanding between the Commission
and the Department, the Commission submitted its ultimate findings
on time optioning to the Antitrust Division and requested a formal
20 For example, see STAFF OF SUBCOMm. No. 5, HOUSE CoMm. ON THE JUDICIARY,
85TH CONG., 2D SEss., THE ANTITRUST LAWS (Comm. Print 1959); Hearings Before the
Antitrust Subcommittee, House Committee on the Judiciary, Monopoly Problems in
the Regulated Industries,84th Cong., 2d Sess., serv. 22, pt. 2, vol. 1, at 3309-40 (1956).
" The option time practice is discussed and analyzed in NETvoRK BROADCASTING
279-401.
8
" For the antitrust analysis of the option time practice, see NETWORK BROADCASTING 379-89. See also FCC Docket No. 12285, In the Matter of Study of Radio and
Television Network Broadcasting, at 3636-64 (1958) (testimony of Louis H. Mayo).
2- FCC Docket No. 12285, In the Matter of the Study of Radio and Television
Network Broadcasting (1958).
OFCC 58-37 (1958), FCC Docket No. 12285.
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opinion on the antitrust aspects of the practice.8 1 By letter of
February 27, 1959, the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the
Antitrust Division rendered a formal opinion to the FCC Chairman
in which it was concluded that "viewed either as an 'exclusive dealing' or 'tying' device, the Commission's own findings require the
conclusion that option time runs afoul of the Sherman Act. ' 2 The
exclusive dealing analysis, in brief, was that time optioning predisposed or obliged affiliates to take network programs, thereby unduly
restricting competition by independent program sources, nonnetwork advertisers, and independent stations and unduly restricting
new network entry. The tying device analysis was that desired programs were tied to undesired programs, contrary to the principles
established in United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.88 and
Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States.8 4 While finding that time
optioning ran afoul of the Sherman Act, the Department did not
file an antitrust suit to prohibit the practice. On inquiry by the
press, the Department explained that it would await disposition of
the time optioning proceeding before the Commission.8 5
The case law relating to antitrust aspects of broadcasting handed
down since this formal opinion was rendered does not derogate from
the position that the option time practice "runs afoul" of the
Sherman Act.3 6
-- FCC 59-33 (1959), FCC Docket No. 12285. The understanding had been that
findings on both the "time optioning" and "must buy" practices would be submitted
for opinion on the antitrust aspect. However, thereafter the "must buy" practice
was voluntarily discontinued. Accordingly, the findings on "must buy" were not
transmitted. Prior to 1957, CBS and NBC engaged in the so-called "must buy"
practice, under which the advertiser, as a condition to using the network service, was
required to purchase time from a "basic" group of stations designated by call letter. It
was found that some advertisers were required under this practice to take some stations
not desired and that, in exchange for the economic advantage of being placed on
the "must buy" list, some stations accepted network programs which they would not

otherwise have been disposed to carry.

NETWORK BROADCASTING

523.

Also, the

practice was of doubtful legality under § 1 of the Sherman Act, since it was similar
to the "tie-in" and "block booking" practices condemned in Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953), and United States v. Paramount

Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131

(1948).

NETWORK

BROADCASTING

502-22.

Following

these findings and the recommendation that the practice be prohibited, CBS and NBC
voluntarily discontinued the practice.
32FCC Docket No. 12285, FCC Document No. 70379 (Feb. 27, 1959).
"334 U.S. 131 (1948).
' 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
sr Broadcasting, March 9, 1959, p. 70.
"' In United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962), the Supreme Court held
that block booking of copyrighted motion pictures for television exhibition was a
tying arrangement in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. The Court emphasized
that the fact that the block booking arose in the context of television, rather than
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Although the Commission has stated that its regulation of broadcasting must be compatible with the antitrust laws, it did not choose
to follow the formal opinion that time optioning violated the Sherman Act. Rather, it issued a notice of rule making, looking toward
a further limitation of time optioning. Thereafter, it modified the
option time rule so as to reduce the period subject to option from
three to two and one-half hours in each of the four segments of the
broadcast day, and it provided greater flexibility to the broadcaster
in rejecting programs offered by the network during option time.37
An appeal was taken from the Commission's decision, one basis
being that time optioning violated the antitrust laws.38 Thereafter,
the Commission moved to remand the case for a review of its report
and order in the option time matter,3 9 and the motion was granted.
After further notice of rule making,4 0 the Commission, by a six to
one vote, determined that time optioning was not essential to the
operation of networks and prohibited time optioning on the ground
that the practice restrained competition contrary to the public interest. The decision was not based, in whole or in part, on the
41
antitrust laws.
In putting to one side industry contentions that it was inappropriate for the FCC to reconsider the time optioning matter, the
Commission stated that it must be free at any point in time to weigh
motion pictures, was not a basis for distinction. Id. at 48. In CBS v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 295 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1961), it was held that the television "service" is not
a "commodity" within the Clayton Act. However, the decision does not preclude a
finding that option time is an unreasonable restraint, or even a per se violation,
contrary to § 1 of the Sherman Act. United States v. CBS, 215 F. Supp. 694 (S.D.N.Y.
1963), involved a CBS compensation plan which had a strong clearance incentive
in the nature of a substitute for option time. A motion for final judgment without
trial was denied on the ground that a per se violation of the antitrust laws had not
been established and that determination of the legality of the restraint should be
reached on the basis of a trial. American Mut. Ins. Co. v. American BroadcastingParamount Theatres, Inc., 221 F. Supp. 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), involved a network requirement that the advertiser accept, as a condition to advertising over the network,
a total of 130 stations or the financial equivalent thereof (the so-called "minimum
buy" practice), whereas the advertiser desired only ninety-five stations. The network's
motion for summary juldgment was denied since the complaint alleged a possible
tying arrangement under § 1 of the Sherman Act.
37 FCC 60-1089 (1960), FCC Docket No. 12859.
38 Times-Mirror Broadcasting Co. v. United States, Case No. 16068 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
0 FCC 61-529 (1961), FCC Docket No. 12859.
40FCC 61-582 (1961), FCC Docket No. 12859.
,1 28 Fed. Reg. 5501 (1963); FCC 63-497 (1963), FCC Docket No. 12859. The FCC
denied three petitions for reconsideration of this report and order. FCC 63-802
(1963), FCC Docket No. 12859.
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the restraining effect of a practice against its essentiality.4 2 Insofar
as the public interest standard is concerned, this is a sound doctrine.
Broadcasting is a dynamic industry and, as circumstances in the industry change, the FCC has a duty to evaluate the changed circumstances in the light of the public interest standard. However, any
such evaluation must be compatible with the antitrust laws. It may
be noted that since the Commission's report and order on time
optioning rely upon the public interest standard in prohibiting
the practice rather than upon the antitrust laws, the door is left open
to reinstate the practice in the event that changing circumstances
warrant such action.
B. The NBC-Westinghouse Exchange of Stations
Another instance in which the Department and the Commission
reached conflicting decisions in a broadcasting matter having antitrust aspects involved the transfer by Westinghouse Broadcasting
Company of its station in Philadelphia to the National Broadcasting
Company.43 The FCC staff report pointed out that the importance
to Westinghouse of NBC affiliation for its stations in Philadelphia,
Boston, and Pittsburgh exerted pressure on Westinghouse in the
negotiations with NBC. On the public interest level, the proposed
exchange involved a problem of undue concentration of control by
NBC of wholly owned stations in the middle Atlantic states, constituting a possible violation of the Commission's multiple ownership
rules. On August 12, 1955, the Commission advised the Department of the proposed transfer and of the results of its investigation.
Three members of the Commission favored approving the transfer
without a hearing. However, the majority caused so-called section
309 (b) letters44 to be sent to the parties. On the basis of the com42 FCC 63-497, para. 61 (1963), FCC Docket No. 12859.

"The NBC-Westinghouse exchange of stations, including the conflicting positions
of Department of Justice and FCC on the antitrust aspect, was the subjcct of
extensive hearings by the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee on the
Judiciary. The Subcommittee's findings are reported in Report on the Television
BroadcastingIndustry, H.R. RFP. No. 607, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 97-108 (1957).
44 Section 309 (b), as of the period of the NBC-Westinghouse exchange of broadcasting stations, provided that if it should be unable to find that the public interest,
convenience, and necessity would be served by grant of an application, the Commission
should advise the applicant and other known parties in interest of "the grounds and
reasons for its inability to make such finding" and give them an opportunity to reply.
Upon receipt of the responses, the Commission was required either to approve the application, if it was able to find that the grant was in the public interest, or to set
the matter for public hearing if it still was unable to make such a finding. Act of
July 16, 1952, ch. 879, § 309(b), 66 Stat. 715.

Vol. 1964: 282]

BROADCASTING INDUSTRY

ments so elicited and without further hearing, the Commission approved the transfer on December 21, 1955. On December 27, 1955,
before this action had been made public, the Department notified
the Commission that there was a "serious question" that the proposed transfer violated the antitrust laws and that the Department's
investigation would soon be completed. On the following day, before the Department's letter had come to the attention of the
Commission, the Commission's approval of the transfer was made
public. The Department then filed an antitrust suit to challenge
the transfer. It should be noted, however, that in this suit the
Commission filed a pleading concurring in the Department's position that the Commission's grant to NBC was not res judicata on
the antitrust aspect.
C. The CBS Compensation Plan
The third example relates to a compensation plan which Columbia Broadcasting System and some of its affiliates adopted in 1961.
This plan had a strong clearance incentive factor and was thought by
some to be a substitute for time optioning. Under the plan, the
station received only ten per cent of the station rate for the first
sixty per cent of hours cleared for network programs and sixty per
cent of the station rate for each additional hour. The usual share
received by the station for all hours cleared is thirty per cent of gross
billings. Obviously, a broadcaster cannot clear time for the network
for ten per cent of the station rate and operate profitably. Accordingly, the plan in effect deferred a portion of the payment for most of
the hours cleared and imposed as a condition of payment of this
portion the clearance of substantially all programs offered by the
network. On October 25, 1961, the Commission advised CBS that
the incentive plan restrained internetwork competition and interfered with the licensee's program responsibilities, and it asked for
comments from CBS and its affiliates. 45 The Department investigated the antitrust aspects and decided to file an antitrust action.
Conferences between the Department and the Commission were
held in which, according to a trade journal account, the Commission
advised that the contemplated antitrust action would not have an
adverse effect on the Commission's consideration of the matter and
that the Commission would withhold action until the court had
'-FCC 62-586 (1962), FCC Document No. 20398.
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ruled in the antitrust suit.46 On April 12, 1962, the Department
filed the antitrust suit. On May 29, 1962, the Commission found
that the CBS compensation plan violated its rules and ordered that
the plan be discontinued. 47 One commissioner dissented on the
ground that the Commission should not act until the antitrust suit
had been determined. It should be noted that in this instance both
the Department and the Commission, while proceeding independently, were acting to prohibit the offending practice.
III
THE APPLICABLE LAW
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is applied to determine
whether a matter shall be considered by a regulatory agency before
the matter comes under judicial scrutiny.48 If Congress has vested
primary jurisdiction of a matter in the regulatory agency, the courts
withhold action until the agency has decided the matter.49 Of
course, enforcement of the antitrust laws is vested by Congress in
the Department of Justice. 50 While some transactions approved by
regulatory agencies are expressly exempted from the operation of the
antitrust laws.15 the exemption of actions approved by the FCC is
limited to mergers of common carriers and does not apply to broadcasting. 2 Accommodation of the antitrust and regulatory approaches to the promotion of competition in broadcasting is governed
largely by the decisions of the Supreme Court in United States v.
RCA 53 and Californiav. FPC.5 4
The RCA case involved the transfer by the Westinghouse Broadcasting Company of its station in Philadelphia to NBC. The Commission, after considering and deciding all issues relative to the
46Broadcasting, April 16, 1962, p. 50.
4"FCC 62-586 (1962), FCC Document No. 20398. Petitions to reconsider were disposed of, the Commission adhering to the position that the plan hindered the affiliate
in substituting nonnetwork programs. FCC 63-500 (1963), FCC Document No. 35830;
FCC 62-1143 (1962), FCC Document No. 26181.
48Arr'y
GEN. NATL CoMm. ANnTRusr REP. 261-93 (1955); Fut.DA, op. cit. supra
note 3, at 439-52.
49 Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907).
o62 Stat. 909 (1948), 15 U.S.C. §§ 4, 25 (1958).
1 See statutes cited note 2 supra.
n'48 Stat. 1080 (1934), 57 Stat. 5-6 (1943), 47 U.S.C. §§ 221 (a), 222 (b)- (c) (1958). See
also letter from FCC Chairman to the Chairman, Senate Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, Jan. 3, 1957, in Hearings Before the Senate Interstate and Foreign
Commerce Committee, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 4, at 3116-18 (1956).
53358 U.S. 334 (1959).
" 369 U.S. 482 (1962).
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antitrust laws which were before it, approved the transfer. The
Department then filed an antitrust suit to upset the transfer. 55 The
Supreme Court, after carefully tracing the legislative history of the
Federal Communications Act, held that the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction did not foreclose the Department from bringing an
antitrust suit against a transfer approved by the Commission, since
the Federal Communications Act did not provide a pervasive
scheme of regulation of broadcasting and did not give the Commission power to decide antitrust issues as such. In so holding, the
Supreme Court reiterated advice it had previously given that the
Commission, in acting in the "public interest, convenience, and
necessity," may consider antitrust policy and that the Commission
may deny a requested action solely on the ground that the action
would be incompatible with antitrust policy.56
In Californiav. FPC, the Supreme Court had before it the question of whether a regulatory agency may take action which goes to
the merits of the antitrust aspect of a transaction after an antitrust
suit has been filed with respect to the same matter. That case involved the merger of two power companies under the Natural Gas
Act, which contains no express exemption of actions by the FPC
from the antitrust laws. Prior to the merger, the Department had
filed an action alleging that acquisition by one of the companies of
the other's stock violated section 7 of the Clayton Act. Motions
by the companies to dismiss the antitrust action were denied. Thereafter the FPC notified the Department that it would not stay its
proceedings and invited the Department to participate in the administrative proceedings. The Department declined to participate.
The FPC carried forward its proceedings and authorized the merger,
which was consummated. The Supreme Court held that the action
by the FPC was invalid because it could not proceed to a decision
on the merits when a suit under the antitrust laws challenging the
validity of the proposed merger was pending. In so holding, the
Supreme Court stated:
Our function is to see that the policy entrusted to the courts is not
frustrated by the administrative agency. Where the primary jurisdiction
is in the agency, courts withhold action until the agency has acted....
The converse should also be true, lest the antitrust policy whose enforce" See text at page 292-93 supra.
" United States v. RCA, 358 U.S. 334, 351-52

(1959).
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ment Congress in this situation has entrusted to the courts is in practical
7
effect taken over by the Federal Power Commission.5
As the dissent points out,
The holding does not turn on any facts or circumstances which may be
said to be peculiar to this particular case. It is not limited to the Federal
Power Commission proceedings.... [T]he Court appears to lay down a
pervasive rule ...that seemingly will henceforth govern every agency
action involving matters with respect to which the antitrust laws are
applicable and antitrust litigation is then pending in the courts5 8
There appears no reason why the decision would not be applied to
all actions by the Federal Communications Commission relative to
broadcasting in which the decision reached is incompatible with the
antitrust laws, if antitrust litigation is pending in the courts. In
fact, the Court drew an analogy to actions by the FCC, stating:
Here, ... [as in the RCA case], while "antitrust considerations" are
relevant to the issue of "public interest, convenience, and necessity,"...
there is no "pervasive regulatory scheme"... including the antitrust laws
that has been entrusted to the Commission.59
It appears that the Supreme Court intends for the doctrine to apply to any agency action if there is no express statutory exemption of
the action from application of the antitrust laws and the statutory
authority under which the regulatory agency acts does not authorize
the agency to put into effect a "pervasive regulatory scheme." 00
Since broadcasting is an area of free competition and is not expressly exempted from the antitrust laws, it is clear that the doctrine
of Californiav. FPC applies to broadcasting.
57
8

California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482, 490 (1962).
I at 491.
1d.

' Id. at 485.
Query whether the restraint on regulatory agencies imposed by the
RCA and Californiacases extends to action of a regulatory agency which is compatible
with the antitrust laws. For example, in the matter of the CBS compensation plan,
after Department of Justice had filed an action alleging that the plan violated the
antitrust laws, the FCC, while the suit was pending, found that the plan violated its
rules and ordered that the plan be discontinued. It must be recognized that, even
if such FCC action does not render an antitrust suit moot, the strength is drawn out
of the suit when the defendant has been prohibited by regulation from continuing
the practice. Yet, if the practice is offensive to the antitrust laws and against the
public interest, the greater public interest seems served by permitting regulatory
action, compatible with the antitrust laws, to be taken at the earliest feasible time.
OSee Sobel, Approvel Mergers and Antitrust Laws, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 735 (1962),
relating to the applicability of antitrust laws to combinations approved under the
Bank Merger Act, the Federal Power Act, and the Natural Gas Act.
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IV

ACCOMMODATION OF THE ANTITRUST AND REGULATORY
APPROACHES IN BROADCASTING

The existing relationship of the antitrust laws to the broadcasting
industry is undesirable because it results, on the one hand, in long
delay in obtaining requisite governmental approval or, on the other
hand, in wasteful "unscrambling" of enterprises or. the discontinuance of long-standing industry practices.
Under the California v. FPC ruling, the Federal Communications Commission, as has been shown, cannot proceed to a decision
on the merits of a matter when a suit challenging the validity of the
proposed transaction is pending. In a sense, this is inverted primary
jurisdiction. This doctrine may result in long delay in action by
the Commission, since some antitrust cases, through investigation,
deliberation, and court proceedings, require several years to run
their course. Meanwhile, the administrative process is "hamstrung,"
and the regulatory agency must hold in suspense an application for
a permit or some other important action. Recognizing the merit
of staying regulatory action the validity of which is questioned in a
pending antitrust suit, procedures should be adopted under which
antitrust litigation which holds up regulatory action will be expedited.
Under the RCA decision, the Department of Justice may upset
a transaction which has been approved by the Commission and
effectuated by the industry if the transaction is found to contravene
the antitrust laws. Important economic decisions are made with an
approving pat on the back by one hand of government while the
other hand of government upsets the transaction. While a regulatory agency should not be permitted to frustrate enforcement power
entrusted by the Congress to the Department, neither should two
arms of government be so lacking in coordination.
The Commission and the Department have alleviated the difficulty to some degree through informal liaison. When the Commission determines that a matter before it seems to present an antitrust
question, the Commission instructs its legal officers to advise the
Department thereof and to inform the Department of developments.6 ' However, the Commission does not deem itself obligated
"1FCC letter, Jan. 3, 1957, supra note 52.
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to withhold action on a matter which presents an antitrust question.
Recognizing that rulemaking which approves an industry practice or
transaction having an antitrust aspect may render prosecution of the
antitrust suit more difficult, the Commission sometimes consults
with the Department prior to taking final action in the rulemaking
proceeding.0 2 The Department, upon request by a regulatory
agency, will advise it regarding the antitrust aspects of a matter before the agency. For example, upon the request of the Commission
for advice regarding the antitrust aspect of the time optioning practice, the Department rendered a formal opinion advising that the
practice ran afoul of the Sherman Act. Also, the Department may
intervene in agency proceedings if the matter concerns competition
3
in the public interest.
Similarly, the Department may issue a "clearance letter" to a
private party who requests review of a proposed transaction for possible antitrust violation. The "clearance" waives the Department's
right to bring a criminal proceeding against parties who put into
effect a proposed business transaction, but it does not prevent the
Department from instituting civil proceedings. 4 It is clear that the
Department does not intervene in many matters before administrative agencies, including the Commission, in which a possible antitrust violation may arise from the contemplated course of action.03
For example, the Department did not intervene in any of the three
matters heretofore discussed in section 11,06 all of which involved
serious antitrust problems. Under existing law, the Commission is
not required to give notice to the Department that an antitrust issue
has arisen in a matter involving broadcasting, and the Department
67
has no duty to intervene in such proceedings.
One way of eliminating conflict between the Department and
the Commission in promoting competition in broadcasting is to
exempt the adjudicatory and rulemaking functions of the Commission from the antitrust laws. Statutory exemption of transactions
approved by regulatory agencies has been enacted in several im2ibid.
03 VAN CISE, UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST LAWS

205 (1963).

" Id. at 206-07.
" See Arr'Y GEN. NAT'L CoMM. ANTITRUST RxP. 286-87 (1955).
06 See text at pages 289-94 supra.
07 United States v. RCA, 358 U.S. 334, 352 (1958).
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portant business areas, 8 but the exemption approach has not thus
far been extended to broadcasting. 69
Exemption of transactions approved by regulatory agencies from
operation of the antitrust laws should be carefully limited. Once the
area is exempted from the application of antitrust laws, the discipline
imposed by free competition is prevented and the necessity for a
substitute discipline, regulation by the agency, is increased. While
the McLean doctrine 70 cautions the regulatory agency, acting in an
exempt area, to take into account the effect of the curtailed competition against the advantage in service resulting from the transaction,
regulatory agencies are not geared to applying competitive principles
to what they conceive of as an interventionist field.71 Although the
anticompetitive impact of an industry practice or transaction should
be studied in the context of the circumstances in the industry, the
antitrust laws encompass principles which should be developed
uniformly in their application to the whole industrial-commercial
complex. Exemptions undercut this growth and weaken the antitrust fabric. Moreover, the r 6 gulatory agencies tend to expand unduly the area to which the exemption applies.7 2 It has been sometimes suggested that regulatory agencies become conditioned over a
period of time to the point of view of the industry with which they
are in continuing association. In some situations loss of objectivity
may result in considering other points of view in the public interest,
such as that represented by the antitrust laws. The public interest
seems best served by limiting exemptions from the antitrust laws to
those instances in which regulation is or should be so pervasive that
there is little, if any, room for meaningful competition in any degree.
In this vein, the Attorney General's National Committee to Study
the Antitrust Laws stated:
This Committee, we repeat, endorses competition as the major rule in
our private enterprise economy. We recognize that competition can be
impaired either by conduct transgressing the antitrust laws or by government regulation fixing prices or rates or restricting freedom of entry.
The Committee notes an apparent trend toward such government con08 See statutes cited note 2 supra.
00FCC letter, Jan. 3, 1957, supra note 52.
McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67, 87-88 (1944); see also text
at note 4 supra.
71For an amplification of this view, see ArTr'y GEN. NAT'L COMm. ANTITRUST REP.
288-93 (1955) (views of Louis B. Schwartz).
72 Ibid.
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trol. We call attention
to the fact that such regulation tends to beget
73
further regulation.
Exemption of broadcasting from the operation of the antitrust
laws would be especially unwise. Broadcasting is an area of free
competition. While broadcasting is regulated by the Commission,
it is regulated with a view to promoting competition. The antitrust
laws are expressly made applicable to broadcasting because it is an
area of free competition. The Commission recognizes a duty to
maintain a system of broadcasting which is compatible with the
antitrust laws. Furthermore, in applying the public interest standard, the Commission encourages competition by prohibiting industry
practices or degrees of concentration which, while anticompetitive
in a degree which is contrary to the public interest, do not constitute
violations of the antitrust laws. Accordingly, it would be highly
inappropriate to extend the pattern of statutory exemptions to include the broadcasting industry.
It is submitted that the best approach to accommodating the
roles of the Department and the Commission in promoting competition in broadcasting would be a "marriage" of the Department and
the Commission. To avoid delay in obtaining approval of a transaction or "unscrambling" of a long-standing transaction or practice,
a procedure should be adopted under which the Department would
have a mandatory duty to intervene in any matter before the Commission involving an antitrust aspect. The intervention would be
for the sole purpose of conducting the antitrust aspect of the hearing
and, within a reasonable time after closing the record, of rendering
a formal opinion as to whether the existing or prospective transaction, practice, or rule would contravene the antitrust laws. The
Department would benefit from the expertise of the Commission in
broadcasting matters, and this would be helpful to the Department
in determining whether a particular course of action would constitute a violation of the antitrust laws. The Commission, where a
violation of antitrust law was not established, would be aided by the
Department's expertise in antitrust matters in weighing the antitrust
factor with the others which comprise the public interest standard.
In most instances the Department and the Commission should reach
the same determination at the administrative level. Thus, delay occasioned by litigation would be avoided and the broadcaster or other
3

7

Id. at 269.
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component of the industry would know whether it was free to take
a course of action without danger of later challenge by the Department. The industry would be saved the substantial economic loss
which results from "unscrambling" complicated business enterprises
and relationships.
In an exceptional case, the Department might conclude that the
contemplated action was contrary to the antitrust laws and the Commission might conclude that the requested action was in the public
interest and did not constitute a violation of the antitrust laws. In
such a case, the business concerned would be on notice of the
proximity of Scylla and Charybdis and, in the light of that knowledge, it could determine the wisdom of continuing on course. Moreover, with the benefit of the record already made, in the event of a
disagreement between the Department and the Commission regarding the antitrust aspect, the Department would be prepared to file
an antitrust suit promptly. While expediting statutes may often be
of questionable merit, a difference of opinion between two arms of
government provides a reasonable basis for expediting any such
antitrust cases, and expedition should be provided by statute. Interested parties would thus be able to obtain a decision on the antitrust aspect prior to making a heavy investment in a risky venture.
The suggested statute might be drafted along the following lines:
In any adjudicatory proceeding or rulemaking proceeding, the Commission shall ascertain, as early as the information before it permits,
whether there is a reasonable possibility that the requested or proposed
action might constitute a violation of the antitrust laws. Upon a finding
that such reasonable possibility exists, the Commission shall inform the
Department of the finding and the information on which the finding is
based. In the event that the Department is of the opinion that a matter
before the Commission involves a reasonable possibility of violation
of the antitrust laws and the Commission holds a contrary view and does
not report the matter to the Department, the Department shall have the
right to intervene in the matter for the sole purpose of determining the
antitrust aspect.
Upon receiving such finding, the Department shall, within thirty
days, or if further investigation by the Department is required, within
ninety days, (a) intervene in the proceeding for the sole purpose of
determining the antitrust aspect, or (b) notify the Commission in writing
that it does not find a reasonable possibility of antitrust violation upon
the information submitted to it. In the event that the Department
does not intervene in the proceeding, this shall constitute a defense in
any subsequent antitrust suit in the same matter by either the Depart-
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ment or a private litigant, in the absence of substantial new evidence of
antitrust violation or subsequently occurring facts constituting substantial evidence of antitrust violation. If the Department intervenes in
the proceeding, it shall have the responsibility of conducting, with the
cooperation of the Commission and its staff, the antitrust aspect of the
hearing.
Upon completion of the hearing, the record shall remain open for
ninety days for the receipt of a formal opinion from the Department on
the antitrust aspect. Such opinion may conclude (a) that the contemplated action does not constitute a violation of the antitrust laws, or (b)
that the Department is of the opinion that the existing circumstances or
contemplated action, if permitted to continue or occur, would constitute
a violation of the antitrust laws and the Department will within ninety
days file an antitrust suit to prohibit the existing practice, or the contemplated action, should the Commission approve such action. In the
event that the Department should find that there is no objection to the
existing practice or proposed action on antitrust grounds, this finding
shall constitute a defense to any antitrust action on the same matter
brought by the Department or a private litigant, in the absence of substantial new evidence of antitrust violation or subsequently occurring
facts constituting substantial evidence of antitrust violation.
If, after giving notice that it will not intervene, or if, after intervening
and giving a formal opinion that the contemplated action would not
constitute a violation of the antitrust laws, substantial new evidence of
antitrust violation or subsequently occurring facts constituting substantial
evidence of antitrust violation is obtained, the Department shall have
authority to file a civil antitrust suit in the matter. However, such evidence shall not be competent in a criminal proceeding except as to a
party who had knowledge of the evidence and withheld it.
In the event that the Department should find that the existing practice or contemplated action would contravene the antitrust laws and
the Commission should authorize the continuance of the existing practice
or initiation of the contemplated action, and in the event that the Department should thereafter file an antitrust suit to prohibit the existing
practice or contemplated action, such suit shall be expedited and shall
be given precedence on the federal court calendars over all antitrust
suits not arising out of a transaction approved by, or a rule adopted by,
a federal agency or department.
The suggested statute would recognize as a defense to an antitrust suit a formal opinion by the Department that it should not
intervene because the circumstances do not show a reasonable possibility of violation of the antitrust laws or a formal opinion,
rendered after the Department's intervention in the hearing, that on
the basis of the hearing there is no indication that the existing practice or contemplated action would, if permitted to continue to occur,
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constitute a violation of the antitrust laws. However, it is not
contemplated that such a formal opinion would provide a defense
where substantial evidence existed but was not submitted to or
discovered by the Department in the initial determination or was
not developed in the record of the hearing. It would be in the
interest of the parties in such cases to bring out all the evidence in
order to gain the benefit of the defense. If substantial evidence of
antitrust violation existed and the Department lacked knowledge of
it, an antitrust suit could thereafter be brought on the basis of such
substantial newly discovered evidence. Similarly, the defense would
not apply in situations where a transaction which was lawful when
effected subsequently threatens competition due to changes in the
industry or interindustry relationships. The Department must not
be foreclosed from bringing an antitrust suit at any time that such
changing circumstances result in the transaction's becoming a violation of the antitrust laws. 74 Nevertheless, the defense would provide
a practical basis for action by the broadcasting industry. The substantial new evidence or subsequently occurring facts test would
assure that in most instances the transaction would withstand scrutiny by the Department at a later time.
The suggested statute contemplates that the Department would
have a reasonable time within which to make the initial decision
whether it should intervene and a reasonable time after the hearing
within which to render a formal opinion on the antitrust aspects.
It may well be that the time intervals included in the suggested
legislation, thirty days and ninety days, respectively, are too short.
The views of the Department, the Commission, and the industry
regarding this suggested statute have not been obtained. It is not
known whether they would oppose the suggestion. If not, they could
unquestionably contribute substantial improvements to the proposed statute.
The Department already has manpower problems, and the suggested statute would require additional manpower for execution.
However, if the suggestion has merit, it should be possible to persuade the Congress to provide funds for the additional personnel
necessary to participate in the Commission hearings on matters
having antitrust aspects. There would be a counter-balancing manpower saving because the Department would have made an investi"' United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
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gation in connection with the administrative hearing and thus would
have the benefit of the Commission's investigation and the record in
the hearing.
The Department may well feel that it loses tactical control of
antitrust litigation when the issue develops in an administrative
proceeding before the Commission. The Department's hand in any
subsequent antitrust action would be revealed in the administrative
hearing. It is true that the issue may be forced at a time which is
not propitious for successful antitrust prosecution. However, the
thrust of federal procedure is in the direction of pretrial disclosure.
It is believed, moreover, that any such considerations are outweighed
by the importance of concurrent determination by the Department
and the Commission of the antitrust aspect of the matter.
The suggested statute applies to rulemaking proceedings presenting an antitrust aspect, as well as to adjudicatory proceedings.
The Department may have greater concern regarding intervention
in a rulemaking proceeding than in an adjudicatory proceeding.
The Department usually operates in the context of a concrete case.
It may feel that it ties its hands as to future antitrust litigation if it
renders a formal opinion that the conduct permitted by a proposed
rule would not constitute a violation of the antitrust laws. Rulemaking proceedings normally involve one or more specific proposals.
Hence, the Department would be able to limit its opinion to concrete proposals. Moreover, this possible objection is partially overcome by the preservation in the suggested statute of the Department's power to bring an antitrust suit where substantial new evidence of antitrust violation is found or develops. If new developments in the industry should render a practice which was valid when
approved anticompetitive and contrary to the antitrust laws, the
Department or the Commission would be free to reconsider the
matter.
There would seem to be little basis for objection by the Commission to the suggested statute. Two cooks would not spoil this
broth. While the Commission recognizes a duty to regulate compatibly with the antitrust laws, the Commission is not expected to
be expert in antitrust matters. In terms of procedure and personnel
organization, the Commission is ill equipped to evaluate antitrust
fact elements in the public interest concept, but the Department is
well equipped to provide the antitrust expertise. The antitrust
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laws apply to broadcasting, and the Supreme Court has stayed the
Commission's hand from the time of the filing of an antitrust suit
regarding a matter before the Commission. If the Commission approves on public interest grounds a transaction which contravenes
the antitrust laws, the transaction may thereafter be upset in an
antitrust suit. The suggested statute would not place any additional
limitation upon action by the Commission. It does not preclude
approval by the Commission of a transaction after receiving a formal
opinion from the Department that the transaction would contravene
the antitrust laws. The suggestion would provide the Commission
with the guidance of such a formal opinion. The opinion would be
based upon a hearing in which the Department and the Commission
have participated jointly, each benefiting from the expertise of the
other. It is believed that an opinion rendered on the basis of a
hearing record and after the substantial contact between the Department and the Commission which joint conduct of a hearing
would entail would carry far greater weight with the Commission
than an opinion not so based. Accordingly, it is believed that the
Commission, after a period of experience under the suggested statute,
would with rare exception follow the opinion of the Department on
the antitrust aspect, at least where the opinion was based upon
settled law.
The Commission is well equipped to consider facts in the public
interest context and possesses expertise in broadcasting matters.
Accordingly, it is questionable that the Commission should follow
advice of the Department which is not based on settled law, if the
Commission deems the proposed action to be in the public interest.
In the event of such conflict, the Department could promptly bring
the matter to issue in the courts under the suggested procedure for
expediting antitrust suits when a prospective action by the Commission was being held in suspense.
The industry may well oppose the suggestion. The suggested
solution would provide, in most instances, uniformity of the Department and Commission position with respect to the antitrust
aspect of a transaction, and this uniformity would emerge at the
administrative level. This would place the industry on firmer
ground in determining whether it should embark upon a contemplated venture. The determination of the antitrust aspect would
be made timely and would avoid the "unscrambling" of enterprises
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or relationships with attendant economic waste. Unquestionably,
industry desires such assurance. However, the broadcasting industry
is accustomed to dealing with the Commission, and it may well feel
that Commission waters are more salubrious than the climate in the
Department. The industry may fear that the greater certainty provided by the suggested statute would be the certainty of a formal
opinion that a desired course of action would "run afoul" of the
antitrust laws. Given a choice between the existing situation and
the suggested statute, it is quite possible that the industry would
favor the status quo. The broadcasting industry would probably
favor the express statutory exemption approach. However, as has
been previously indicated herein, exemption from application of the
antitrust laws is foreign to an area of free enterprise like broadcasting.
It should be remembered always that to have a marriage two
parties must consent, and it is not certain that a "shot gun" marriage
would be more harmonious here than it has proved to be in domestic relations. Moreover, in the light of the broadcasting industry's possible desire for the status quo, it may not be a marriage
which is proposed but an eternal triangle.

